We show that financial-conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds (FCAHFs) have more stable funding and lower flow-performance sensitivity than other funds even though they are less likely to impose impediments on withdrawals. Arguably due to their privileged access to funding, during periods of financial turmoil, FCAHFs are able to take more risk and to purchase less liquid and more volatile stocks than other hedge funds. During good times, instead, FCAHFs expand their assets less than other funds and are less exposed to systematic risk factors. Thus, FCAHFs appear to perform a stabilizing function for the financial system even though they do not generate higher returns for their investors.
1
A new wave of financial regulation following the global financial crisis aims to curtail proprietary trading by systemically important financial institutions. For instance, in the U.S., the Volcker Rule prohibits "banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading and from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund". 1 The Liikanen Report and the Vickers Report advice similar or even tougher initiatives in the EU and in the UK, respectively. As a consequence, hedge funds that are sponsored by financial conglomerates (i.e., financial-conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds, henceforth FCAHFs) could cease to exist, even if they are funded mostly using other investors'
capital.
The rationale of these regulations is limiting risk taking by financial conglomerates that are systemically important and directly or indirectly benefit from public guarantees. Current regulations, however, could have unintended consequences on financial markets not least because, on the aggregate, hedge funds are known to exercise a stabilizing function on financial markets (e.g., Aragon and Strahan, 2012 , Jylha, Rinne, and Suominen, 2014 , Cao, Chen, Goetzmann and Liang, 2015 . While on average hedge funds' ability to contribute to price formation may be impaired in periods of market turmoil ( Ben-David, Franzoni, Moussawi, 2012 , Jylha, Rinne, and Suominen, 2014 , Cao, Liang, Lo, and Petrasek, 2014 , during these periods, FCAHFs could be 1 The Volcker Rule refers to § 619 (12 U.S.C. § 1851) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. On December 10, 2013, the necessary agencies approved regulations implementing the rule, which were scheduled to go into effect April 1, 2014. On January 14, 2014, after a lawsuit by community banks over provisions concerning specialized securities, revised final regulations were adopted. On December 18, 2014, the Federal Reserve extended the Volcker Rule's conformance period for "legacy covered funds" (i.e. hedge funds and private equity funds) until July 21, 2016, and indicated it would likely extend the period further to July 21, 2017. The extension to 2016 is the second of three possible one-year extensions the Federal Reserve may issue under the Dodd-Frank Act. better at performing this function than other hedge funds thanks to their funding characteristics.
Surprisingly, there is no evidence on how affiliation to financial conglomerates affects hedge fund advisors' structures, incentives, and strategies. Exploring these effects is even more crucial before the implementation of regulations that could impair the existence of investment funds associated with financial conglomerates.
This paper attempts to make a first step in this direction. We conjecture that FCAHFs, benefitting from the reputation and visibility of the financial conglomerate, are likely to be among the asset managers that Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) identify as enjoying more trust. FCAHFs are also likely to receive stable funding from other subsidiaries of the group and may attract clienteles of investors, such as wealthy individuals , who are less likely to chase performance. Not only do these factors directly lead to significantly less redemptions from FCAHFs during periods of financial turmoil or following weak performance, but they can also exert an indirect retention effect on the funds' other clients. In particular, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) and Goldstein, Jiang and Ng (2015) highlight that there exist strategic complementarities in investors' redemption decisions. For this reason, the investors in FCAHFs may be less prone to engage in runs on the funds' assets.
Less volatile funding and more established reputation may in turn affect asset managers in various ways. As Stein (2005) highlights, a lower sensitivity of flows to performance is expected to affect fund managers' strategies and may make asset managers more inclined to provide liquidity especially if this implies taking a longterm view on investment. However, the benefits of a lower sensitivity of flows to performance may come at a cost, as redemptions play the beneficial roles of disciplining fund managers and reallocating capital from low to high ability fund managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . These costs may be accentuated in FCAHFs, which in bad times may be tempted to purchase risky assets from other subsidiaries of the financial conglomerate in need for liquidity, similar to the behavior of affiliated funds of mutual funds (Battacharya, Lee, and Pool, 2013) .
To investigate these issues, we start by assembling a novel dataset of hedge fund ownership, mostly hand-collected from regulatory filings. This dataset allows us to construct a measure of financial conglomerate affiliation. We then show that FCAHFs have access to more stable funding and explore how this affects the nature of the services that FCAHFs are able to offer to their investors and the way they operate in the market.
We start by showing that FCAHFs experience fewer redemptions during periods of financial turmoil. Furthermore, their flows are less sensitive to performance, especially following low returns. FCAHFs also appear able to offer investors different contracts. We find that FCAHFs impose less redemption restrictions, have a larger number of investors, and a higher dispersion of their assets across different investor classes. These features may also reflect FCAHFs easier access to funding. Large investors are expected to internalize the negative effects of their redemption decisions on the profitability of a fund's strategy and to be less inclined to redeem (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2014 2008; Bhattacharya, Lee and Pool, 2013; Golez and Marin, 2015; Ferreira, Matos, and Pires, 2015) . On the other hand, conflicts of interest do not negatively affect the performance of institutional funds and hedge funds (Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka, 2013) .
More closely related to us, Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) show that money market funds that were part of financial conglomerates were less inclined to take risks during the global financial crisis, presumably because of reputational reasons. Abbassi, Iyer, Peydro, and Tous (2015) show that during the financial crisis, German banks with more trading expertise increased their investments in less liquid fixed income securities at the expense of credit. Fang, Ivashina and Lerner (2013) study how bank sponsored private equity deals differ from unaffiliated ones. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to focus on the financing and trading of hedge funds belonging to financial conglomerates. The lower level of regulation and supervision to which hedge fund managers are subject in comparison to other asset managers allows them more contractual and trading freedom, thus potentially accentuating the benefits and costs of their affiliations to financial conglomerates.
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature exploring the characteristics of asset managers that favor liquidity provision and risk taking. For instance, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (2011) find that hedge funds were highly exposed to the IT bubble. A number of recent papers, 6 instead, show that hedge funds tend to provide liquidity and to be contrarian investors. 
Data and Sample

Identifying FCAHFs
The main data sources of this study are ADV regulatory filings that we merge with the union of three commercial datasets, as described below. 2012 and 2015; Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2008) .
Crucially for our purposes, Item 7 of the ADV Form requests investment advisers to report information on their financial industry affiliations and activities. The funds have to report whether any subsidiary or any other entity which is under common control with the filing adviser provides financial, legal, or brokerage services. We define an investment adviser to be part of a financial conglomerate if the investment adviser declares to be related to a banking or thrift institution, to an insurance company or agency, or to a broker dealer.
We identify hedge funds using three commonly used commercial datasets, Lipper Tass, CISDM/Morningstar, and Hedge Fund Research, from which we also obtain information on hedge funds' characteristics including returns, assets under management, and other contractual characteristics.
As Agarwal, Fos and Jiang (2013) describe, the three commercial datasets we use provide information on largely different subsets of hedge funds. Following the procedure described in Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2014), we manually merge the databases by management company name. Then, we exclude multiple share classes for the same management company. We end up with a sample of 21,892 distinct funds over the period between 1994 and 2013.
Next, we merge the information from the union of the three dataset with the ADV filings using the management company names. Out of the 8717 firms in our sample, we are able to find a match in the ADV filings for 2258 firms (about 26%), which manage 5693 distinct funds over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . In our merged sample, there are 1929 (about 34%) financial-conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds.
Sample Representativeness
One may wonder to what extent our sample is representative of the general hedge fund universe. The main concern arises from the fact that up to the introduction of Rule IA-2333 2011 and explore what proportion of them changes status. We find that this is the case for less than 2% of the hedge funds suggesting that our procedure of attributing missing status to hedge funds that report only in a few years should not introduce big biases.
Second, we perform all of our tests in an alternative sample in which we abstain from backward imputation of the financial-conglomerate status. The results we report hereafter are qualitatively unchanged further indicating that our procedure of constructing the panel of hedge funds and their financial conglomerate affiliations does not introduce large biases.
One may also wonder whether the sample of hedge funds reporting to the commercial dataset that we are able to merge with ADV forms is selected. To evaluate the extent of selection problems, Table 1 compares the main characteristics of the funds in the merged commercial datasets and in the final dataset for which we are able to find a match with the ADV filings. We consider unmatched onshore hedge funds because our sample based on U.S. regulatory filings can be representative only of funds active in the U.S. market.
Unsurprisingly, given the minimum threshold on assets for mandatory registration, the hedge funds that we are able to match with ADV filings are somewhat larger. This finding suggests that we should control for size in our regressions. While there are some statistical differences in returns or in fees, these are not necessarily economically significant. The most remarkable difference is that our dataset has relatively more funds of funds than the union of commercial datasets. Hence, style controls are also included in our regressions.
Hedge Fund Trading
We perform tests on two other samples, which allow us to explore hedge funds' trading and liquidity provision at different frequencies. Venkataraman (2013), we consider a negative execution shortfall a proxy for liquidity provision.
Characteristics of FCAHFs
FCAHFs are a sizeable part of the hedge fund industry. During our sample period, we always classify at least 30% of our sample hedge funds as FCAHFs. Among these, 14% are affiliated with a bank, 7% with an insurance company and the remaining with broker dealers. 4 As shown in Figure 1 , the proportion of FCAHFs has been increasing over time, even though it decreases in 2010, possibly in anticipation of regulations after the financial crisis. In the aggregate, FCAHFs in our sample always control at least 40% of the hedge fund industry assets under management, indicating that FCAHFs are larger than other funds. (2004) factors. FCAHF's skewness is more negative, although not significantly so.
Financial Conglomerate Affiliation and Access to Funding
Financial intermediaries' ability to provide liquidity in financial markets during periods of market turmoil is often impaired by investors' redemptions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In this section, we explore whether FCAHFs enjoy a special status in financial markets and experience less redemptions during these periods. These funds may be special for several reasons. They may invest the capital of the financial conglomerate and its subsidiaries, which is naturally less volatile. In addition, they may be considered more trustworthy by investors, thanks to the reputation of the financial conglomerate they are affiliated with. Investors may also be less inclined to redeem if they expect the capital coming from within the financial conglomerate not to be withdrawn. Thus, runs on the financial intermediaries arising from the payoff complementarities of the fund investors may be less likely to arise (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2014) . All these elements should contribute to making these funds less financially fragile.
We perform two types of tests to evaluate the validity of this conjecture. First, we test whether during periods of market turmoil FCAHFs experience lower redemptions, holding constant other characteristics of the funds that may lead to similar outcomes. Second, we estimate whether flows are less sensitive to performance for FCAHFs, indicating that they have access to more stable funding. For both these tests, we use quarterly data, given that redemption restrictions, typically present in hedge funds, constrain investors' ability to withdraw their funds at higher frequencies.
As is common in the literature, quarterly net flows are computed as the change in assets under management relative to the prior quarter minus the dollar return on prior quarter assets, divided by prior quarter assets:
where , is the total net assets under management in quarter t for fund , and , is fund j's quarterly return, which is obtained from compounding the fund's monthly returns.
We capture periods of market turmoil using the VIX index, a measure of implied volatility in S&P500 index options. The VIX index is often referred to as the "fear gauge index" (Whaley, 2000) and is commonly used in the literature to identify periods of market stress and high aggregate market volatility (see, for instance, Adrian and Shin, 2010; Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl, 2012; Nagel, 2012; Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti, 2013) . We define high VIX periods as quarters during which the average VIX index exceeds the 75th percentile of its distribution. This allows us to concentrate on periods of extreme aggregate market volatility, such as the recent financial crisis.
We test whether quarterly net flows are larger during these periods for hedge funds affiliated with financial conglomerates. In all specifications, we control for fund size, age, the logarithm of redemption restrictions, and the fund's performance, captured by the fund's fractional ranking in the cross-sectional distribution of the funds' returns. We also include style and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. Table 3 shows that FCAHFs indeed experience less withdrawals in periods of financial turmoil. In column 1, FCAHFs grow less than other funds, which may be due to their already larger size. FCAHFs having access to the conglomerate sales channels may reach faster their optimal size and for this reason they may appear to receive less flows on average. However, in periods of high VIX, the quarterly flows of FCAHFs experience smaller drops (by 0.9%). This is a large number considering that the average hedge fund has flows equal to the 3.6% of assets in an average quarter.
Moreover, large funds and funds belonging to large families may benefit from a reputational advantage in attracting flows. We find however that differently from FCAHFs, they become less, not more able to attract flows in periods of high VIX (columns 2 and 3). In column 4, also share restrictions appear ineffective during periods of high VIX, confirming the findings in Ben David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012).
Thus, these results suggest that FCAHFs have an edge during periods of market turmoil. This edge does not appear to be driven exclusively by investments within the financial conglomerate, which we proxy in column 5 using the percentage of assets invested by banks and insurance companies in the fund. This result suggests that FCAHFs' investors are less likely to run on the fund assets in periods of high VIX.
Being part of a financial conglomerate could lead to lower redemptions only during periods of high VIX, when financial conglomerates' less volatile funding and potential loans in case of distress may reduce the strategic complementarities between investors and avoid runs on the intermediaries. Alternatively, it could always translate into a lower flow-performance sensitivity.
To test this conjecture, we adapt the model of Sirri and Tufano (1998) . In particular, we regress the fund's quarterly flows on its raw return percentile ranking relative to other funds. A higher value of the fund's fractional rank here means better performance.
In Panel A of Table 4 , we estimate the flow-performance relation unconditionally. As expected, in column 1, a higher fractional rank leads to larger flows. Column 2 shows that this relation is weaker for FCAHFs. In column 3, we distinguish the effect of flows on performance for funds in the bottom, middle, and top terciles because performance may matter most for bottom and top performing funds.
Importantly, in column 4, being part of a financial conglomerate appears to weaken the relation between flow and performance, especially for bottom-performing hedge funds (FRANK1).
In Panel B of Table 4 , we condition the flow-performance sensitivity on the realizations of the VIX and further control for variables that could affect this relation.
The main result is that FCAHFs have a lower sensitivity of flows to poor performance during bad times, as proxied by periods of high VIX.
The other estimates in Panel B, Table 4 , show that large funds, but not funds belonging to large families, seem to share with funds that are part of financial conglomerates a lower flow-performance sensitivity. Importantly, the lower flowperformance sensitivity of FCAHFs does not appear to be driven by other hedge funds'
characteristics. The flow-performance sensitivity of FCAHFs remains lower even when we control for the effects of these other fund characteristics. Also, the top performing FCAHFs appear to attract lower flows as is consistent with their larger size and the interpretation that they reach optimal size faster than other funds thanks to the sale channels of the financial conglomerate.
Overall, FCAHFs appear to have more stable access to funding than other funds.
As implied by the theories of Stein (2005) 
The Performance and Risk Taking of FCAHFs
We start exploring how the returns of FCAHFs compare with the returns of other hedge funds. In Table 5 , the returns of FCAHFs are lower than those of other funds whether we consider raw returns (columns 1 and 2) or we risk-adjust returns using the market return (column 3) or the Fung and Hsieh (2004) eight factors (column 4). These effects do not appear to depend on fund or family size or other funds characteristics. As we show below, however, the lower alpha of FCAHFs is not necessarily driven by lower unconditional skill, but to a large extent by time-varying exposure to aggregate market risk. This suggests that when other market participants are less risk seeking, FCAHFs take more aggregate market risk (columns 2 to 3). In terms of magnitude, FCAHFs have higher volatility of about 9.4% of a standard deviation of the dependent variable in high VIX periods. On the contrary, FCAHFs' return volatility is significantly lower in normal times, in the specification with controls (column 3).
For robustness, we also define a proxy for strong market conditions, using the index of market sentiment of Baker and Wurgler (2006) Consistent with our earlier findings, the volatility of returns of FCAHFs is lower in periods of high sentiment, that is, when market conditions are strongest and other market participants are generally more inclined to take risk.
Similar conclusions emerge if we look at the funds' exposures to aggregate risk factors. Column 1 in Panel A of Table 7 shows that FCAHFs' returns appear to have higher exposure to aggregate market risk in high VIX periods. The contrary is true during periods of strong market sentiment. During these months, FCAHFs appear less exposed to systematic risk factors than other funds. In some specifications, unconditional differences in performance tend to become statistically insignificant, as evident from the slope on the financial-conglomerate dummy.
In Panel B and C, we control for differential exposure to a broader set of risk factors. In particular, in Panel B, we consider in addition to the market returns the Fama French factors, the momentum factor and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. In Panel C, we include the eight Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. In both instances, we continue to find that in periods of high VIX, FCAHFs are more exposed to aggregate market risk. The contrary is true in periods of high sentiment. In some cases, controlling for differential exposure, partly explains the unconditional differences in performance.
Overall, FCAHFs appear to have a countercyclical propensity to take on risk.
This has beneficial effects on their returns in the months that follow periods of market turmoil. Table 8 shows that FCAHFs exhibit higher returns than other funds three to five months following periods of market turmoil suggesting that these funds are able to benefit from market rebounds. The effect is economically significant as, e.g., three months after a high-VIX period, the FCAHFs exhibit about 17 basis points higher monthly returns than other hedge funds (that is, about 2% higher annualized returns).
Trading Strategies and Liquidity Provision
It appears that a lower flow-performance sensitivity and better access to funding during periods of financial turmoil lead FCAHFs to have a more countercyclical exposure to risk than other funds.
To investigate the implication of more stable funding on trading strategies, we focus on the subsample of hedge funds that we were able to merge with Thomson Financial 13F. Panel A of Table 9 provides stock-level evidence that FCAHFs increase their exposure to high-volatility stocks during periods of market turmoil. Moreover, in high-VIX periods, FCAHFs purchase stocks that have been falling in value.
In Panel B, we study how the proportion of the stock held by FCAHFs varies as a function of stock-level liquidity, which we measure using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio and the bid-ask spread (columns 1 and 4, respectively), in normal times and during periods of high VIX. Contrary to other hedge funds, FCAHFs increase the proportion of illiquid stocks that they hold during high VIX periods, while other funds decrease their holdings of illiquid stocks.
Thus, FCAHFs appear to provide liquidity during high VIX periods. Such conclusion is also supported by Table 10 , which focuses on the funds' average price impact. FCAHFs have lower price impact than other hedge funds during high VIX periods when they trade in high volatility, low past return, and illiquid stocks. These findings suggest that FCAHFs provide liquidity in bad times, consistent with the evidence in Table 9 .
These results confirm that FCAHFs are more inclined to take risk and to be liquidity suppliers than other funds and that this tendency is more accentuated in periods of financial turmoil.
Financial Conglomerate Affiliation and Contractual Characteristics
This section provides evidence that access to funding affects not only the strategies adopted by these funds, but also their contractual characteristics. Anticipating more stable funding, not only may FCAHFs be able to trade in a way that stabilizes financial markets, but they may also offer more liquidity to their investors. This feature is valuable for investors (Ang and Bollen, 2010) and, consequently, it improves the reputation of the fund family (Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis, 2015).
To decrease their flow-performance sensitivity, hedge funds often impose lockup periods during which new investors cannot recover their funds (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009) . Once the lock up period has expired, investors must often give the fund advance notice (e.g., one month) before redeeming. Investors may also be able to redeem only at fixed dates (e.g., every quarter), which denote the redemption frequency. These contractual impediments to withdrawals are collectively referred to as share restrictions.
Having lower flow-performance sensitivity, FCAHFs may be able to offer investors less restrictive contracts. The data support this conjecture. Table 11 shows that FCAHFs offer their investors strictly shorter lock up periods (column 1), shorter redemption notice periods (column 2), and higher redemption frequency (which we measure in column 3 using the average duration between redemption dates). Thus, FCAHFs offer their investors shares with significantly lower restrictions (column 4).
The effects are also economically large. For instance in column 4, the financial conglomerate affiliation dummy explains one quarter of the standard deviation of the logarithm of total restrictions.
FCAHFs also seem to impose smaller minimum investment requirements to investors although the effect is not significant at conventional levels (column 5).
Overall, besides providing liquidity in financial markets, FCAHFs appear to offer more liquidity to their investors than other, unaffiliated, hedge funds.
Conclusion
Following the Volker Rule and similar regulations around the world, it has been argued that limiting proprietary trading by banking institutions could have unintended negative consequences on market making and liquidity in financial markets (Duffie, 2012) . We highlight a so far neglected consequence. Severing the ties between financial conglomerates and hedge funds may curtail the counter-cyclical risk taking and the liquidity transformation function that financial-conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds (FCAHFs) seem to perform in financial markets.
We show that FCAHFs experience lower redemptions at times of financial turmoil and have lower sensitivity of flows to performance than other hedge funds.
Thanks to their more stable funding, FCAHFs appear better able to provide liquidity and take on risk at times of crisis, performing a stabilizing function on the financial system.
FCAHFs are also able to reach more numerous investors suggesting that they broaden access to alternative investments. However, they provide investors lower net-of-fees risk-adjusted performance than other hedge funds. Finally, we show that FCAHFs impose lower restrictions to redemptions, giving higher liquidity to their investors.
Hence, the benefits associated with the organizational structure of FCAHFs do not accrue to investors in terms of better performance, but rather in terms of the higher value of the liquidity option that they grant.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A compares the mean of salient fund characteristics for the unmatched funds in the union dataset, our universe, and the funds in the union dataset matched with the ADV files. Panel B compares FCAHFs and other hedge funds in our sample. Panel C reports summary statistics on the variables that are used in the analysis. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix 
. Clienteles and Fees
The dependent variable is indicated on top of each column. In column 1 and 2, we estimated pooled panel regressions with time fixed effects. The unit of observation is the fund month. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. In the rest of Panel A, we estimate cross-sectional regressions. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the fund level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (-6 .996) (-0 .491) Number of .190*** -0.754*** -0.060*** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.018** (-12.854 ) (-5 .092) (-4 .338) (-9 .130) (-0 
Panel B. Performance Features
The dependent variable is indicated on top of each column. We estimate cross-sectional regressions. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the fund level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 3 FCAHFs and Net Flows During Periods of Financial Turmoil
This table regresses quarterly fund flows on the high VIX dummy and fund characteristics. All regressions include time and style fixed effects and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) .009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** (-4 .597) (-4 .698) (-4 .775) (-4 .698) (-4 (-0 .787) (3.756) Log Age -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** (-19 .789) (-19 .708) (-19 .510) (-19 .811) (-19 .818) Log Size -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (-4 .803) (-5 .387) (-3.505 ) (-4 .674) (-4 This table estimates the flow performance sensitivity of different types of hedge funds. We regress the quarterly flows of a fund on the funds' fractional rank at the end of the previous quarter and control variables. A hedge fund's fractional rank (FRANK) represents its percentile performance relative to other hedge funds. In the piecewise linear regressions, we define FRANK1=min(FRANK, 1/3), FRANK2=min(FRANK-FRANK1, 1/3), and FRANK3= min (FRANK-FRANK1-FRANK2, 1/3 ). All regressions include time fixed effects and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the quarter level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** (-7.234 ) (-7.112 ) (-7.342 ) (-7.186) Log Age -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** (-19.203 ) (-19.358 ) (-19 .048) (-19.208 -0.022*** (-3.788) Log Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** (-4.666 ) (-7 .058) (-6.213) Log Age -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** (-21.377 ) (-19.524 ) (-19 -0.00087*** -0.00084*** -0.00119*** -0.00094*** (-3 .342) (-3.235 ) (-8.241 ) (-6 
Table 6 Volatility of Returns
The dependent variable is the firm's return computed as standard deviation of monthly returns on a twenty-four-month rolling window. Mkt Cond is a dummy variable that takes value equal to one when the value of the associated market conditions proxy is in the top quartile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the fund and month level. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (-4 .125) (-3 .492) (-3 .712) (-3 .301) Large Fund -0.00727*** -0.00725*** -0.00726*** (-12.260 ) (-12.252 ) (-12 .245) Large Family -0.00232*** -0.00238*** -0.00234*** (-3.537 ) (-3 .626) (-3 In all panels, the dependent variable is the monthly fund return in excess of the risk free rate. Mkt Cond is a dummy variable that takes value equal to one when the value of the associated market conditions proxy is in the top quartile. In Panel A, we consider only the market risk as aggregate risk factor. In Panel B we use a five-factor model including the Fama-French SMB and HML, the momentum factor, UMD, and the Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity factor, PS. In Panel C, we use the Fung and Hsieh eight-factor model. All factors are interacted with a financial-conglomerate-affiliated dummy and a marketconditions dummy for months in the top quartile of the distribution of market conditions. The levels and all double interactions are also included. Standard errors are double-clustered at the fund and time levels. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 9 Fund Trading
Panel A. One-Factor Model
The unit of observation is the stock quarter. In Panel A, the dependent variable in columns 1 (2) and 4 (5) is the change in shares of stock i held by financial-conglomerate-affiliated (other) hedge funds between quarter t and t+1, divided by the shares of stock i held by financial-conglomerate-affiliated (other) hedge funds at the end of quarter t. In columns 3 and 6, the dependent variable is the difference between the dependent variable in columns 1 and 2. We control for the proportion of shares held by financial-conglomerate-affiliated (other) hedge funds at the end of quarter t, Fin Cong Weight (Non Fin Cong Weight). All models are estimated by ordinary least squares and include time and stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The unit of observation is the stock quarter. The dependent variable is the average price impact of FCAHFs (column 1 and 4), other hedge funds (columns 2 and 5), and the difference in price impact between FCAHFs and other hedge funds (columns 3 and 6). All models are estimated by ordinary least squares and include time and stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel
